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Outline
• where this talk comes from
• [unplanned, adaptive ...] systems of systems - what do we 
mean?
• multiple attributes: efficiency, safety, security, ...
• cultures, culture gaps and effects on modelling and insight
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Background to this talk
• I have worked  on dependability matters for some 40 years
• the organisers suggested I distill insights of interest for this 
community
• I'll address how some problems that my colleagues and I 
have been studying
– how to know how well your fault tolerance, your diverse layers of 
defence... work
– how to take into account human components of a system, and 
their changes
– how to integrate in practice considerations of safety, security, etc
– how to reason as to whether events that never happened and 
would better never happen may actually never happen
... are relevant to "systems of systems":
"roles of models and cultures in  dealing with diverse quality 
attributes of complex systems":
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Background to this talk  - 2
Serious anomalies keep happening in complex "systems of 
systems", even when centrally managed for a single goal 
("directed")
e.g. today's New York Times headline
"This did not go well –inside PG&E's blackout control room"
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/12/business/pge-california-outage.html
(the utility company running managed blackouts due to the fire/weather 
emergency in California suffers failures in communicating essential 
information to users)
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The inevitable "definitions" slide
• System of Systems (SoS) — Set of systems or system 
elements that interact to provide a unique capability that 
none of the constituent systems can accomplish on its 
own.  [SO/IEC/IEEE 21839]
I.e. any system is a system of systems?
No: "system" here has an administration/procurement meaning
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The inevitable "definitions" slide, improved
• System of Systems (SoS) : “a set or arrangement of 
systems that results when independent and useful 
systems are integrated into a larger system that delivers 
unique capabilities” 
[DoD Defense Acquisition Guidebook., Systems Engineering Guide for 
Systems of Systems, 2008]
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The inevitable "definitions" slide, improved
• System of Systems (SoS) : “a set or arrangement of systems that 
results when independent and useful systems are integrated into a 
larger system that delivers unique capabilities” 
[DoD Defense Acquisition Guidebook., Systems Engineering Guide for 
Systems of Systems, 2008]
In essence: the components systems are somewhat 
independent - in design, procurement and/or actual 
behaviour and evolution thereof
• creating areas of uncertainty/ignorance
• examples:
– road traffic+road infrastructure; 
– air traffic, ATM and related infrastructure
– a warship or combat aircraft or task force
– a hospital or hospital ward or operating theatre
– smarts energy grids
– E-commerce
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Is "Systems of systems" engineering different from 
system engineering?
First answer: NO
"change in one component [...] may impact the safety of the 
system when that component interacts with other[s] [... 
calling this a "system of systems"  [...] does not solve the 
problem. [...] more information is required [...] than [...] their 
external interfaces [...]   When putting two or more [...] 
("systems") together, the emergent properties must be 
analyzed for the integrated system. Calling that [...] a 
"system of systems" may be misleading by implying that 
emergent properties can be treated differently than any other 
system or different system engineering techniques can be 
used"
N. Leveson, "The Drawbacks in  using the term "system of systems", Biomedical 
Instrumentation and Technology, March/April 2013
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"Systems of systems" engineering: just 
system engineering!
... ideally. 
But "complex systems of systems" make it harder
The pockets of ignorance and uncertainty make it difficult to 
prove what the system as a whole will do
good advice is well established:
.... be concerned with "the end-to-end behaviour of the SoS", 
understand what is going on, "orchestrate" upgrades, 
model/simulate, ....
[DoD Systems Engineering Guide for Systems of Systems, 2008]
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"Unplanned systems of systems" engineering?
• "safety is a system property"... like other important 
properties
– e.g. overall fuel consumption across all highway users
– probability of catastrophic blackouts in a power grid
– financial viability of an infrastructure
• system engineering is about figuring out / controlling 
overall properties of the whole system
• "unplanned [adaptive] systems of systems" are systems 
for which this cannot be done [to the same level of 
accuracy/predictability/confidence to which we aspire for 
simpler and less changeable systems]"
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"Unplanned systems of systems" engineering?
• .....systems for which analysis cannot be done to the 
desired level of accuracy/predictability/confidence"
• is this new? 
Not really: cities, countries, markets are such systems
• Social scientists, managers, ministers ... have dealt with 
such systems for a long time: 
– producing insights (some of them right), some accepted laws, 
some useful techniques ...
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Where are the boundaries of "unplanned systems of 
systems" engineering?
Nowhere:
• even in tightly designed, small embedded computer-based systems meant to 
be immutable in time,  the supplier of a chip can decide changes that 
undermine assumptions made by the system designer
• autonomous entities with their own separate goals will nonetheless obey (to a 
greater or lesser extent) laws/protocols that are designed  (to a greater or 




• i.e., feedback control: monitoring and responding to 
deviations
• should temper the problem of uncertainty/ignorance that 
prevent detailed trustworthy prediction 
• and give some guarantee against bad surprises
• yet for most systems we need some assurance that these 
techniques deliver
hence we need to analyse the whole system ["of 
systems"] including its monitoring/governing functions
– large role for modelling / simulation
• what is hard about it?
– size and complexity of models? (not the main difficulty!)
– completeness? Need for imaginativeness? Yes
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Dealing with multiple quality attributes
Much investment in the last 20 years to address security of 
safety-critical systems, but...
• integration of security concerns still complex, problematic
– different cultures within companies
– safety & security people speak different languages, use different 
concepts
– often different emphasis
+ e.g. safety people want "immutable" designs verified for the long term 
+ vs  security people desiring fast change to address new threats
– often requiring trade-offs in design
+ missing a conflict may cost expensive design rework, or worse
• uneasy evolution in practice and standards
– some consensus that you cannot separate the two: e.g. IEC 61508 
"requires malevolent and unauthorised actions to be considered 
during hazard and risk analysis"
– but much resistance too: e.g. weak support in ISO 26262
16
Safety, security, ... are interdependent
1. one relies on the other: "if it's not secure it's not safe": 
adversaries can cause accidents
2. trade-offs
– goals may conflict
+ requiring operator to prove identity before entering critical 
commands... to prevent malicious commands causing accidents
+ may delay emergency intervention to stop an accident
– safety and security mechanisms may conflict:
+ e.g. extra encryption may slow down communication and violate real-
time requirements
+ redundancy/diversity may increase attack surface
3. many synergies as well
– e.g. a security-oriented precaution may improves reliability/safety
– ignoring this may be costly
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Dealing with multiple quality attributes –
simplification1: separation
• some of my colleagues have been advocating
security-informed safety cases,  with some success
• but in many industrial contexts (both development and 
operation) we hear
– safety is complex enough without worrying about security
– co-ordination too difficult / not needed 
– if I build, operate, upgrade a system that is safe given certain 
conditions
– then you (the security expert) only need to guarantee that the 
assumptions under which I have proved it safe will be and remain 
true
• why not? Have clear "contracts", "rely-guarantee"
• but... is it that easy?
– can (do) experts in one culture define in advance all assumptions 
that the other cultures should keep true?
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Dealing with multiple quality attributes –
simplification 2: standards
• most engineering involves following rules
• safety and security standards abound
• engineers depend on them to
– ensure [a degree of] coverage of design concerns
– cover their backs legally
– protect users
• so what's there to worry about?
• the easier prescriptions to write/follow are about the easier 
requirements
– focused on individual "system", not larger "system of systems"
– focused on individual qualities, e.g. security "controls" or safety 
mechanisms, not their interplay
– deterministic about precautions to take, not probabilistic about their 
results in a complex system
the hard parts may be de-emphasised through absence of direct prescriptions
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Example: project AQUAS
Aggregated Quality Assurance for Systems 
investigating Co-Engineering techniques for safety, security 
and performance in critical and complex embedded systems
• aims at progress
– at various levels of integration
– across the lifecycle
– integrated/able in current development processes
• supported  by tools














at each stage  and  through successive stages.
Safety/performance/security
Co-Engineering  comprises
the entire product lifecycle.
21
"Interaction points"
• one ideal view of how all this should be done :
– system "design models" evolve top-down, accompanied all along
by evolving integrated verification and certification with appropriate 
coverage of all "non-functional attributes"
• AQUAS follows another view
– separate cultures will not integrate any time soon [or ever?]
– "interaction points":
+ points in the lifecycle at which combined analyses (deterministic and 
probabilistic) support:
* detecting the breaking of contracts agreed at earlier stages of 
development, or newly discovered conflicts/synergies; 
* managing trade-offs
+ frequent enough to avoid disastrous rework (or deployment)
+ starting, crucially, with early risk analysis stage
– cf approach in automotive standard environment
+ e.g. SAE J3061 "Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Vehicle 
Systems", new 26262 standard
+ AQUAS aims at adding practical flesh (methods, tools) on this 
bare-bones concept
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Multi-concern modelling techniques exist:
e.g. PIA- preliminary interdependency analysis
key to critical infrastructure protection - potential for cascading catastrophic failures
• method for expert analysis and translation into probabilistic assessment
• Example case studies:
see: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/17456/
water distribution /electrical grid / telecom 
interdependence 
Nordic 32 electrical grid control under cyber-attack 
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Now some examples...
... of culture gaps that may generate modelling gaps
... or that enlightened modelling may alleviate
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Socio-technical systems, or, the human factor
• complex "SoSs" are eminently sociotechnical systems
• interspersed human and  engineered components
• people 
– provide flexible, quasi-invisible fixes for glitches and design errors
– cause some failures, e.g. through lack of global system view
– naturally evolve!
+ someone needs to model/monitor for evolution, especially if harmful
+ e.g.,  safety practices degenerating into rituals, skipped when 
inconvenient
+ consensual violations in sub-SoSs creating dangers after mergers
+ automated aids reducing human abilities ("loss of situation  
awareness", "automation bias")
– cf large literature on resilience, safety/security cultures etc
25
Loss of diversity, or creeping criticality
• partially unplanned SoSs offer redundancy
– cf "high reliability organisations" sociology
– people's ability to flexibly recover from glitches in their and others' 
performance
– similar ideal of multiple independent systems ensuring resilience 
without need for centralised supervision 
• but spontaneously created redundancy may 
spontaneously disappear
– e.g., multiple means for navigation exist
+ but GPS offered such a convenient service that "believed to be 
diverse" systems might all depend on it for a time base
cf U.S. National Timing Resilience and Security Act, 2017
(not a new phenomenon! 
Cf advent of fibre backbone in telecoms; diverse software suites relying 
on common, successful libraries; ...)
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Focus on some risks causes blind spots for others
• example Jan 2018 Hawaii "ICBM attack" false alarm
– two options, “test missile alert”, and “missile alert” (send an alert to 
every mobile phone..  “seek immediate shelter, this is not a drill”
– an accident waiting to happen, following a simple slip
– countermanding was delayed by need for complex authorisation
– simple HCI design mistake...
– also an example of focusing too much on the "main" feared event
• an example of common blind spots: the potential for 
safety/security mechanisms as means for denial of service 
attacks
– e.g. street kids playing the "stop the automated car" game
– or more sinister uses, even to undermine safety
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Controlling risk, or "risks"?
assessing total risk may be blind to real stakeholders' risks 
• example: how safe should autonomous cars be?
– one answer: at least as safe as the average human driver
– if same or less number of deaths / mile driven, who could reasonably 
complain?
• well... the victims of new systematic failure modes may be 
right to complain:
– these failures will "favour" certain people / circumstances
– the switch to "safe" AVs would produce winners and losers
– a status quo may be Pareto-optimal
– apparent optimisation is then really a political, not just technical 
decision




• independence between component systems is
– a complication: how do I ensure good collective behaviour?
– a promise: less likely to be affected by common-cause failures, 
hence a factor for resilience
• common fallacy:
"they are independent, hence they will fail independently"
– thus this form of resilience is overvalued: 
"if these two systems can both perform the service then the 
probability of service failure is the product of their two probabilities 
of failure"
– nonsense: there is no reason why independent operation should 
bring statistically independent failures in the same environment!
(and many possibilities for causally dependent failures, unless these 
SoSs were designed to avoid them)




We do have complex systems that work well, day in day out
• much of it is due to careful design
• much is due to culture (experience, shared habits, tacit 
knowledge, ...)
"That's all well and good in practice, but how does it work in 
theory? "
• That is: culture embodies evolutionary responses to what 
has been experienced
• it may be ill-prepared for new threats, change, rare events
• whole-system modelling, however incomplete, can support 
awareness of what might happen, expand views
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A possible summary?
• Yes, modelling before deployment or change is essential 
for insight
– about what may happen, what should be monitored, how much 
good  the monitoring will do
• knowledge gaps arise not only from "independence" 
between component systems
• ... but from gaps  between cultures
– safety and security
– design and operation
– social sciences and engineering
– ICT services and users of the services
• models and measurement
– if informed by one culture only, may be unhelpful
– if informed  by broad-minded  "what may happen" analysis, they 




related material at: 
https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/cgi/search/archive/advanced?screen=Searc
h&dataset=archive&documents_merge=ALL&documents=&divisions=I
ICSWR&
http://aquas-project.eu/
